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PRECAP; City of Missoula v. Marcy Jane Kroschel
Kirsi Luther
Oral arguments are scheduled for February 28, 2018, at 9:30 a.m. in the
Supreme Court Chambers, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building, Helena,
Montana.
I.

INTRODUCTION

City of Missoula v. Kroschel asks the Court to define the
parameters of an officer’s lawful questioning during a non-vehicular
investigatory stop.1 Montana’s Terry2 stop statute, articulated in Section
46–5–401 of the Montana Code Annotated (the “Terry statute”),
authorizes an officer to request a person’s name and address and an
explanation of the person’s actions when the officer has a particularized
suspicion that the person is committing or has committed a crime.3
Kroschel argues that an officer is limited to the questions specifically
enumerated in the statute and an individual may decline to answer free of
consequence.4
II.

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

20-year old Marcy Kroschel (“Kroschel”) was detained and
questioned by officers at a Griz football game upon suspicion that she had
been drinking alcohol under the age of 21, in violation of Montana’s Minor
in Possession (“MIP”) statute.5 Officer Shannon Parsons (“Officer
Parsons”) first noticed that Kroschel was having difficulty walking and
was leaning on her friend for support.6 Officer Parsons approached to
check on Kroschel’s welfare.7 Upon smelling alcohol on her breath, the
officer asked both young women for identification.8 Only Kroschel was

Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, City of Missoula v. Kroschel,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2017-0184%20Appellant%20Reply%20-%20Brief?id=%7B90D40960-0000-C718-91BE-40D983005C6B%7D (Mont. Nov. 29, 2017) (No.
DA 17-0184).
2
Refers to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–5–401 (2017); see also State v. Ballinger, 366 P.3d 668, 673 (Mont. 2016).
4
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1–5, City of Missoula v. Kroschel,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2017-0184%20Appellant's%20Opening%20-%20Brief?id=%7B8001A25C-0000-CF18-BE17-D84D200E77AC%7D (Mont. June 9, 2017) (No.
DA 17-0184).
5
Id. at 2.
6
Appellee’s Response Brief at 2–3, City of Missoula v. Kroschel,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2017-0184%20Appellee's%20Response%20-%20Brief?id=%7B4016075F-0000-CE1B-8DF3-EDFB9AAF3538%7D (Mont. Oct. 6, 2017) (No.
DA 17-0184).
7
Id. at 2.
8
Id. at 2–3.
1
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unable to produce it.9 Kroschel told the officer that it was in her seat.10
Officer Parsons asked Kroschel for her student ID number, but Kroschel
could not recall it.11 After numerous attempts to evade the question,
Kroschel provided a false spelling of her name and an incorrect date of
birth.12 Officer Parsons was unable to verify her identify with dispatch,
which is often the result of false information, and again asked Kroschel to
provide correct information.13 To help Kroschel make an informed
decision, Officer Parsons explained that an MIP is a citable offense, while
obstruction of justice is a jailable offense.14 Kroschel was uncooperative,
hostile, and tried to walk away.15 Wanting to get away from the crowd,
Officer Parsons brought Kroschel downstairs into a quiet supply room.16
There, in the presence of another officer, Kroschel revealed her correct
name, allowing officers to learn that she was twenty.17
Kroschel was charged with an MIP and obstruction of justice and
pleaded not guilty to both charges in Missoula Municipal Court.18
Kroschel moved to suppress her statements, arguing that Officer Parsons
improperly expanded the scope of her investigatory stop and conducted a
custodial interrogation without Mirandizing her.19 The Municipal Court
reasoned that although Kroschel was “arrested,” no Miranda warning was
required because the “booking exception” applied, and thus denied the
motion.20 On January 28, 2016, at a bench trial, Kroschel was found guilty
of the MIP charge alone.21 Kroschel then appealed to the Missoula County
District Court, which affirmed the decision.22 Kroschel appeals again.23

9

Id. at 3.
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 2.
11
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 3.
12
Id. at 3.
13
Id. at 3–4.
14
Id. at 4.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 24.
17
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 4–5.
18
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 6.
19
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 1.
20
Id. at 27; the Montana Supreme Court has acknowledged that Miranda does not apply to questions
“normally attendant to arrest and custody.” State v. Morrisey, 214 P.3d 708 (Mont. 2009). This
stems from the “routine booking question” exception to Miranda, established by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990). There, the Court provided a class of
exceptions to Miranda for questions designed to elicit the “biographical data necessary to complete
booking or pretrial services.” Id. at 601.
21
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 1.
22
Id. at 2.
23
Notice of Appeal, City of Missoula v. Kroschel,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%20170184%20Notice%20of%20Appeal%20Filed%20--%20Notice%20%20Incoming?id=%7B70C2345B-0000-CC19-A2CB-151CECDDFDA5%7D (Mont. Apr. 3, 2017)
(No. DA 17-0184).
10
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
A. Appellant Marcy Kroschel

Kroschel’s argument is factually persuasive: after Officer Parsons
was unable to verify Kroschel’s identity, Kroschel was brought into a
small supply room, isolated from her friend, and threatened with jail time
until she finally provided officers with her name.24 This, Kroschel argues,
violates the permissive scope of Montana’s Terry statute and Miranda and
requires suppression of her statements.25
First, Kroschel argues that she was seized by Officer Parsons
under an analysis of the Mendenhall26 factors, which include the presence
of several officers, the display of a weapon, physical touching, and the
officer’s language or tone of voice indicating that compliance might be
compelled.27 These factors are non-exclusive and indicate circumstances
under which a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. 28 Such
circumstances constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.29 A
Terry stop seizure is lawful when an officer has particularized suspicion
to believe that a person is committing, has committed, or is about to
commit a crime.30 Kroschel does not dispute that Officer Parsons lacked
particularized suspicion to stop her but rather objects to what occurred
during the stop.31
Specifically, Kroschel argues that police questioning exceeded the
lawful scope of Montana’s Terry stop statute because Officer Parsons
demanded unauthorized information and engaged in extensive
questioning.32 A lawful Terry stop permits an officer’s brief, non-custodial
detention of an individual to quickly confirm or dispel the officer’s
suspicion that a crime has been committed.33 Montana’s statute provides
that an officer conducting a non-vehicular stop may “request the person’s
name and present address and an explanation of the person’s actions,” in
order to “verify” an account of the person’s presence.34 According to
Kroschel, officers did more than request her name: they asked to verify
her identity through numerous means, including her student ID number,
her phone number, and her parent’s phone number, when in reality,

See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 2–5.
Id. at 9.
26
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
27
Id.
28
Id. at 10 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 12–15.
32
Id. at 12.
33
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 12.
34
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 12–13.
24
25

2018

PRECAP; KROSCHEL

11

Kroschel was within her rights not to tell the officer anything.35 Kroschel
further cites the statutes’ legislative history to bolster her argument.36
Kroschel next argues that the Montana Supreme Court’s opinion
in State v. Driscoll37 is on-point and controls the outcome of her case.38 In
Driscoll officers suspect a young man of committing an MIP offense
because they observed him at a bar, holding a beer. 39 Officers approached
Driscoll to ask how old he was.40 Driscoll told the officers that he was 22.41
The officers then asked Driscoll to step outside the bar while they verified
his information.42 This, the Court held, exceeded the scope of Montana’s
Terry statute because at the time the officers brought Driscoll outside the
officers had no justification to expand the scope of their investigation.43
Thus, Kroschel argues, the evidence in the present case must also
be suppressed.
B. Appellee City of Missoula
The City does not dispute that Officer Parsons seized Kroschel
within the confines of a Terry stop but disagrees that the stop was anything
other than a temporary detention which conformed to the requirements of
Montana’s Terry statute.44
The City argues that, at the outset, the stop was lawful because
Officer Parsons had particularized suspicion to believe that Kroschel was
committing an MIP offense.45 Officer Parsons observed a young woman
struggling to walk by herself, which authorized a brief investigation to
quickly confirm or dispel this suspicion.46 However, when Kroschel
provided a false name, Officer Parsons acquired a new suspicion that
Kroschel was obstructing justice.47
The City counters Kroschel’s interpretation of the Terry statute for
three reasons: (1) although the statute authorizes an officer to request
certain information, it does not limit the officer to requesting only that
information;48 (2) the statute permits the officer to use this information to
“verify” the detainee’s presence, making it presumptively unreasonable to
assume that the officer should have to accept any answer, including a false

35

Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 13–14.
37
303 P.3d 788 (Mont. 2013).
38
Id. at 16.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 8–9.
45
Id. at 11.
46
Id. at 15–16.
47
Id. at 11.
48
Id. at 16.
36
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one;49 (3) lastly, Kroschel erred in looking to legislative history when the
statute was clear on its face.50
The City then pivots and makes a counter-argument: even if the
Court finds that Officer Parsons’ line of questioning exceeded the scope
of Montana’s Terry statute, the Court must still look to the Mendenhall
factors to determine whether a seizure occurred in the first place.51 The
City argues that an analysis of those factors indicates that the encounter
between Kroschel and Officer Parsons was consensual.52 Therefore, under
its counter-analysis, the City concludes that the Court could find that
regardless of Officer Parson’s questioning, she never seized Kroschel
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.53
Further, according to the City, State v. Driscoll is easily
distinguished.54 In Driscoll, the young man provided officers with a false
name after the officers asked him to step outside. 55 In this case, however,
Kroschel provided Officer Parsons with a false name during their initial
encounter.56 Officer Parsons was justified in expanding the scope of the
stop after her resulting particularized suspicion that Kroschel was
obstructing justice.
Thus, the City concludes there is no grounds to reverse.57
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Montana legislature enacted the Terry statute to provide
greater protection to Montana citizens than provided under federal law.58
In debate, the legislature specifically rejected the idea that an officer
should be able to demand a person’s name if the person is not using a
motor-vehicle.59 This background, while helpful, is not necessary to
Kroschel’s claim. The plain language of the statute alone provides support
for Kroschel’s reading of it. The permissive language provides an initial
gateway: an officer can request but cannot demand certain information,
and an individual can consent or decline to provide that information free
of consequence.
What’s problematic for Kroschel is that she lied. The City’s
argument on this point is solid: as soon as Kroschel provided a false name
to authorities, Officer Parsons had particularized suspicion to investigate
whether Kroschel was obstructing justice. Thus, the outcome of this case
49

Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
51
Id. at 22–24.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 26 (citing Driscoll, 303 P.3d at 790).
56
Id.
57
Id. at 42.
58
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 13–14.
59
Id.
50
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may depend on how the Court interprets the statute and characterizes the
period-of-time after Kroschel was seized and before she was brought
downstairs:
Scenario 1: The City prevails. The Court entertains but ultimately rejects
the argument that this was a consensual “mere police-citizen encounter”
and finds that Kroschel was seized the moment that Officer Parsons,
“armed and in uniform, display[ed] [her] authority” by approaching
Kroschel and asking to see identification.60
Because Kroschel was seized, the Terry statute applies. The Court
notes the statute’s permissive language, and centers its analysis on the
words “may request,” noting the absence of the word “only” which would
naturally restrict the officer’s questioning. With some fancy-footwork, the
Court describes that the purpose of the permissive language is to define
the detainee’s obligations to answer rather than to limit the officer’s ability
to ask. This is consistent with the general notion that the purpose for the
stop is to allow the officer to conduct a brief investigation. A different
interpretation of the statute would severely restrict the state’s interests and
risk undermining the very purpose of the statute itself. While the Court is
largely left without precedent for its decision, the Court looks to State v.
Nelson to for support. In Nelson, the Court stated that during a Terry stop
an officer may briefly question a detainee, but the “detainee is not
obligated to respond.”61
Because Kroschel volunteered aspects of her identity, the officer
was permitted to ask reasonable follow-up questions in order to “verify”
the information. Thus, the Court concludes that Officer Parsons’
questioning fell within the bounds of the Terry statute.
Scenario 2: Kroschel prevails. The Court entertains, though ultimately
rejects the notion that Officer Parsons’ mere request for identification
violated Kroschel’s rights. The Court notes dicta in State v. Driscoll,
which implies it was wrong for the officer to have asked for an ID, rather
than a name, address, or an explanation of a person’s actions.62 However,
the Court declines to answer whether the mere request for identification
violates the Terry statute, finding error in another place.
The Court explains that its decision is grounded in the Fourth
Amendment and Section 11 of the Montana Constitution’s imperative that
any search and seizure be “reasonable” under the circumstances.63 When
Section 11 is read with Montana’s constitutional right of privacy,64
60

State v. Bar-Jonah, 102 P.3d 1229, 1239 (Mont. 2004).
State v. Nelson, 101 P.3d 261, 265 (Mont. 2004).
62
See Driscoll, 303 P.3d at 790 (stating that “the officers approached Driscoll and asked for his age
and an ID, rather than for his name, address, or an explanation for his actions,” and concluding that
officers “improperly expanded their investigation by taking Driscoll outside.”).
63
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Mont. Const. art. II, § 11.
64
Mont. Const. art. II, § 10.
61
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Montanans are afforded heightened protection against government
intrusion.65 The Court quotes State v. Morrisey, analogizing Kroschel’s
rights under the statute to an arrestee’s rights under Miranda:
A “suspect need not speak with the discrimination of an
Oxford don. Nor need [she] rely on talismanic phrases or
any special combination of words to invoke [her right to
silence] . . . . Lay people are not learned in constitutional
principle or legal nicety, and to require that precise words
be uttered would elevate form over substance.”66
While Kroschel’s statements indicating that she left her ID in her
seat and did not recall her student ID number likely do not amount to an
“unambiguous and unequivocal”67 statement that she declined to answer
Officer Parsons’ questions, her subsequent statements that she wanted to
leave, wanted to go home, and her persistent refusal to provide a correct
name were the “imprecise” and “substantive” equivalent of telling Officer
Parsons that she was exercising her rights to decline to answer. Officer
Parsons’ persistence that Kroschel provide her correct name thus
transformed the Officer’s request into a demand and exceeded the scope
of the Terry statute. Thus, the Court reverses with instructions to grant
Kroschel’s motion to suppress.
V.

CONCLUSION

These are merely two of the numerous ways the Court might
decide this case. Both parties raised additional arguments in their briefing,
and it is possible the Court will resolve the case by finding that officer
questioning rendered Kroschel “in custody” and required a Miranda
warning. Regardless of how the Court decides the case and regardless of
its outcome, the Court’s analysis of the Terry statute is likely to resolve
the ambiguities surrounding State v. Driscoll and provide needed guidance
regarding the scope of questioning permitted by the statute. For these
reasons, the case is likely to be notable.

65

State v. Nixon, 298 P.3d 408, 415 (Mont. 2013).
State v. Morrisey, 214 P.3d 708, 722 (Mont. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
67
Nixon, 298 P.3d at 416.
66

